This article compares the historical and economic characteristics of the Korean, German, and Polish diasporas in the Russian Far East and Central Asia. It also examines the repatriation of these diaspora groups to their homelands, focusing on their financial condition as well as their homeland's past and present policies toward them.
particularly in the Maritime Province of Siberia and Central Asia. It also examines each government's past and present policies toward their countrymen abroad as well as the financial conditions of the diaspora groups who repatriated to their homelands, with a summary of each ethnic group's characteristics.
Based on the study of the policies at the level of the governments, it turns out that the policy of Korea in dealing with the repatriated has been improperly drafted due to the absence of accurate analysis and insights on the issues: Both physical security and mental safety, well-being, and human rights of immigrants. This problem essentially has been influenced by two relevant factors; first, the research of this subject area has hardly been carried out in the Korean society and second, the importance of the subject itself has been underestimated and overlooked in the Korean academic fields. At last, it is my hope that this paper will provide useful background and motivation for the issues that I am going to focus here.
Thus, I expect this study would incite the Korean policymakers of the immigrants and the interested groups to increase their interests and supports in the rights and lives of the repatriates.
The Diasporas of Three Ethnic Groups
I have investigated some environmental contexts related to diaspora phenomena such as historic facts, the causes and the people involved through the literature review. Based on the outcome of the review, I used the case study on the diaspora of three different countries as a qualitative methodology in this research. The study, including the immigrant policies, both economic stability and ability of self-growth of the returned peoples, illuminates the commonalities and differences of the nature of diaspora phenomena in the comparative framework, stressing the past of each ethnic group, justification on leaving the land such as domestic social and political upheavals, legalities, and fundamental principles in the period of diaspora.
The Korean Diaspora
Korean immigrants had begun to appear in the Russian Far East during Korea's drought of 1863-1864. According to Gelb (1995) , the flow continued steadily until another famine in northern Korea in 1869-1870 produced a surge of approximately 15,000 immigrants. To understand what happened to the Korean immigrants in the Maritime Province, it is necessary to begin with a sense of who they were, where they were, and where they came from. Territorial authorities discovered to their surprise in 1929, that most were first-generation immigrants who had filtered into the Soviet Union sometime between the late 1890s and the October Revolution of 1917. Contrary to Bolshevik expectations, almost none of the Koreans had come over the border directly from Korea, nor had they been uprooted by harsh Japanese colonial policies. Virtually all turned out to have entered the Maritime Province of Siberia via Manchuria, where they had wandered for an average of five to eight years before crossing into what at the time was still Imperial Russia (Note 3).
When entering the Russian Far East, which is a part of Siberia, Korean immigrants had tended to assemble in the immediate vicinity of its international borders. For one thing, they had a natural inclination to seek settlement near their own kind. Topography and climate had also limited their penetration further into the interior.
As for the Korean migration from the Russian Far East to Central Asia, the well-known tragic resettlements in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by Stalin's deportation in 1937 were not the first case. As early as 1904 and 1905, hundreds of Koreans exiled from the Far East to the vicinity of Kazakhstan near Tomsk and Perm. Later in 1928, the People's Commissariat on Land Cultivation in Kazakhstan invited 70 Korean families to Kazakhstan to learn their rich knowledge of rice farming. The administration organized KAZRIS (Kazak Rice), a Korean Agricultural Work Cooperative which was established to use Korean agricultural expertise in the cultivation of rice in Kazakhstan (Note 4).
As the Stalin Revolution got under way, increasingly fractious high-level debates took place over the impending collectivization of the Soviet heartland and its importance in the border regions. This led to a rhetorical shift in the summer of 1929, in which talk of voluntary relocation for Koreans was replaced by language of compulsory obligation. That August, the Territorial Executive Committee resolved that Koreans refusing resettlement north of Khabarovsk would be considered lawbreakers. Nevertheless, Stalin and his supporters were not yet ready to move masses of Koreans by force. The outcome in the countryside did not correspond with the tough rhetoric on paper. For example, of the thirteen hundred Koreans that were resettled north of the Amur in 1930, only some 431 of them were done so coercively (Note 5).
This unstable state of affairs ended with the advent of mass collectivization. According to Bone (2003:256) , with Moscow's permission, the Territorial Party Committee resolved to collectivize its Koreans wherever they already were, regardless of citizenship status, and to treat all those who came through the process as rights-vested Soviet citizens. For diplomatic reasons, the relevant resolution did not mention Koreans specifically. Instead, its third point read:
Every person situated on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be deemed a Soviet citizen (priznaetsja grazhdaninom Sojuza SSR) provided he has not proven his belonging to the citizenship of a foreign government (Note 6) This decision to extend citizenship in situ eliminated much of the official rationale for resettling non-citizen Koreans above the Amur.
During the fall of 1937, the Stalinist state took the cruel step of totally eliminating the Far East of its ethnic Koreans and Chinese. It began by ordering the Commissariat of Internal Affairs to evacuate the entire Far Eastern Korean population, regardless of class origin or profession, to the unlikely destinations of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Soviet Central Asia. There have been several theories concerning the compulsory deportation of these Koreans. The one mentioned most frequently is fear about Korean espionage on behalf of the Japanese empire, which occupied the Korean Peninsula at the time. In addition, it was considered that the Soviet Union wanted to keep ethnic Koreans from creating a Korean autonomous region in the Far East, which seems to be the most plausible reason for the Soviet Union regime's decision. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also wanted to use Korean labor forces to cultivate wild land in Central Asia and by doing so, Stalin regime hoped to normalize its relationship with Japan. (Note 7)
The German Diaspora
The formation of the Russian-German diaspora community was initiated via invitation of German experts by Slav noblemen and the Russian emperor in the 18th century. As Russian borders got larger and larger, German colonial immigrants became the source of the German diaspora. The German diaspora in Russia formed against the backdrop of unstable circumstances of German feudalism and the shaky economic situations. Most of the immigrants were from the southwestern German regions of Baden, Luxemburg, and Gessen. Some were also from Babaria, eastern Turingia, northern Saxonia, and Westphalia. Moreover, the Mennonites in Preussen migrated to Russia in the late 18th century, and the Polish-Germans moved there in the 19th century. The colonial immigrants lived in densely populated groups which gradually dispersed (Note 8).
In the Far East region, the German diaspora began to form during the period when the Far East region became colonized. The early German colonial immigrants were the descendants of the soldiers, doctors, public officials, and teachers who had lived in Russia for a long time. The representatives of German trade capital played an active role in the formation of German communities. The capitalists had to find a new land and market for selling goods and raw materials because of the rapid growth of the German industry as well as the limitation of landowners' properties and the domestic market. German capital penetrated into Asia, including China in the 19th century, and spread to the Maritime Province as Russians colonized the southern part of the Russian Far East.
The Russian domestic policy had a great influence on the formation of German communities before the Russian Revolution. The Tsar government deemed the establishment of German diaspora advantageous for its economic growth, considering it as the solution for the colonization of the Russian Far East, the new land. Somewhat similar to the case of Korean immigrants, the Russian government stipulated diverse privileges concerning the social and economic lives of the German immigrants. The privileges inspired the Germans to acclimate themselves to new social, economic, and cultural environments, which, as a result, helped preserve their language, religion, and cultural uniqueness. Soon thereafter, however, the previous policy of providing privileges to the German ethnic immigrants was abrogated in large part because of international pressure. Following these measures, the legal status of the German diaspora weakened, and at the same time, anti-German atmosphere in Russian society expanded in the latter half of the 19th and the 20th centuries. During World War I, such anti-German sentiment was even assumed as part of the Soviet Union's national policy associated with German phobia and its fixation of persecuting German spies.
The Polish Diaspora
Unlike the Korean and German diasporas, the detailed accounts on the Poles in the Far East were not particularly noted, with very little documentation on the Polish migration to the region (Note 9). The migration of Poles to Central Asia, however, can be dated back to the 18th century in which the inflow was voluntary and the number of immigrants was relatively small. Larger numbers of Polish deportees arrived in Kazakhstan during the 19th century and consisted of members of Polish secret organizations who fought against a Russian Empire that had participated with Prussia and Austria in the partitioning of Poland. Others were soldiers and civilian fightersparticipants of the 1830/1831 and 1863 uprisings aimed against Russian occupation. According to the first Russian population census in 1897, there were as many as 11,579 Poles in Central Asia. A peculiar characteristic of this group was that more than 90 percent of the Poles were male. This was a consequence of the nature of the population movement -forced deportation of political detainees (Note 10).
The next mass deportation of Poles to Kazakhstan took place in the second half of the 1930s. The Polish population that was deported at this time originated mostly from the western part of the Ukrainian Republic of the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree from the Dzierzynski Polish National Region in Belarus. The Polish autonomous regions in the Soviet Union were created in the early 1920s, initially in the hope of creating a model socialist Polish society. The Soviets expected that the inhabitants of these regions could help in the process of "Sovietization" of Poland.
World War II was a tragic period in the history of Polish settlements in Kazakhstan. After September 17, 1939, the day the Red Army invaded Poland, the Soviet authorities began deporting the population of the Eastern Polish territories they had occupied to Kazakhstan or Siberia. This time deportation did not embrace whole families. Instead, exile affected mostly women and children (Gross, 1988) , constituting approximately 80 percent of the deportees. Many Polish men were either absent due to military service or were murdered on the spot by the Narodnij Komissariat Wnutrennych Del (NKWD) (Note 11) (Iwanow, 1991) .
A Comparison of Korean, German, and Polish Diasporas
In dealing with ethnic migration, many Russian researchers and scholars have tried to classify the diaspora communities in Russia based on their current situation and/or theoretical definitions regarding diaspora phenomena. Among the researchers, Chaptykova (Чаптыкова) suggested the categorization of modern Russian diaspora according to their ethnicity and the existence of their nation-state, as in Table 1 .
Another Russian scholar, Astatsaturova (Астацатурова) classified diasporas as in Table 2 . Astatsaturova stipulates that the diasporas as described in Table 2a , 2b, and 2c are external diaspora communities, whereas the diaspora in Table 2d is an internal community.
The Korean, German, and Polish diasporas fall into the same categories when characterized by the aforementioned criteria. All three diaspora groups living in Russia have their own nation-state in foreign countries (Table 1c) and are the result of ethnic migration (Table 2b) .
However, Koreans, Germans, and Poles differ in their reasons for migration. Among these three ethnic groups, most of the Germans migrated voluntarily, whereas the Poles faced tragic compulsory deportation (Note 12), and the Koreans experienced both voluntary migration to the Russian Far East and compulsory deportation to Central Asia during the periods of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.
In the case of Germans, the German diaspora began to formulate in the early 20th century. The German diaspora consisted of mainly engineers and businessmen who migrated to Russia along with their families for commercial reasons. Residing in the cities due to their profession, they were involved in international trading and interacted actively with foreign countries. These German communities contributed positively to the economy of the Maritime Province region and got along well with their surrounding communities.
The Poles, on the other hand, had a completely different experience. During the revolt of April 1794, the Poles who led resistance against the Russian forces were deported to Siberia. This deportation was repeated with Polish militant fighters and criminal detainees in November 1830/1831 and in January 1863. Historically, there was also a massive compulsory migration of Poles to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in several phases during the 20th century. After World War I following the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917, Poland gained independence from Imperial Russian rule. Polish independence rendered territory in the Soviet Union for the establishment of Polish enclaves for its migrant inhabitants. Thus, those areas were declared to be Polish Autonomous Districts until Joseph Stalin implemented agricultural collectivization and abolished autonomies after which the Polish residents in the autonomous areas were forcibly deported to Kazakhstan 1934 and 1938 (Note 13) .
Meanwhile, the Korean diaspora that started to formulate in the late 19th century in the Maritime Province region of Russia consisted mainly of peasants. These Korean peasant migrants voluntarily went to Russia looking for a new place to farm and subsist. Accordingly, the Russian government, hoping for rapid colonization of the Far Eastern region in a similar way as they did with the German migrants, created friendly policies for the Koreans to settle the region. Then, during the fall of 1937, the Stalin state decided to expel all ethnic Koreans from its Far East region. It began by ordering the Commissariat of Internal Affairs to move the entire Far Eastern Korean population to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. It is impossible to present a definite number of Koreans affected overall by the mass relocation. However, it is clear that over a 45-day period in 1937, a minimum of one hundred seventy-five thousand of them were evacuated from the Far East to Central Asia.
Although the initial motives of the Russian government to allow the Korean and German diasporas to settle in their country may have been similar, there are several notable differences between the two diaspora groups. First, the Korean ethnic community was formed as a result of voluntary migration, motivated by the prospects of new land on which to reside and political aid from the government in accordance with the Russian expansion policy to the Far East. The Korean community also became the source of an ethnic anti-Japanese movement. Because of its anti-Japanese sentiment, rather than focusing on the ethnic characteristics of the Korean diaspora itself, most of the studies of this Korean ethnic community have centered on the nature of its ethnic customs and culture, with a central focus on the preservation and succession of the motherland's spirit against Japanese pillage.
The German community, on the other hand, began its establishment in the Maritime Province in the early 20th century with groups of professionals voluntarily colonizing Russia for commercial purposes. Whereas the economic activities of the Korean diaspora communities centered around agriculture, the German communities based their economic activities on trade and commerce.
The Korean and Polish diaspora communities both experienced unwanted deportation to Central Asia under the Soviet Union Regime. In general, the Kazakhstan Poles resided in the northern territories living in collective farms (kolkhoz) and state-owned farms (sovkhoz) while the Kazakhstan Koreans inhabited mostly the southern areas, engaging in small and medium-sized businesses. Consequently, urbanization was much higher among ethnic Koreans than ethnic Poles.
The Governments' Policies on Their Fellow Countrymen and the Repatriates' Economic Conditions in Their Homelands

Homeland Repatriation Policies
It is believed that the standard of culture, the degree of civilization, and the status of human rights of a nation can be judged by various factors of its social norms and governmental policies. Under the circumstances that a society has always been faced with and will continue to be challenged by problems of migration, integration, interculturalism, and the relations between minorities and majorities, one of the factors may be how the government deals with its overseas brethren at the state level. There are considerable differences among Germany, Poland, and Korea regarding their attitudes toward their citizens residing abroad.
Germany's policies for its immigrants are well-known and fairly active. The salient points are that ethnic preference policies were firmly established in Germany for decades and that the rationale for the policies was not economic. The policy that brought the millions of co-ethnics to Germany was Article 116(1) of Germany's Basic Law, or Constitution enacted in 1949, at a time when the possibility of great numbers of ethnic Germans in foreign countries returning to their home country was fading behind the hardening Iron Curtain. Article 116 made provisions for the restoration of citizenship (Note 14). Moreover, the law only applied to ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Germany distinguishes between co-ethnics based on where they reside. Finally, it applied to these areas because there was a presumption that ethnic Germans there faced persecution and needed help.
Unlike Germany, however, neither Poland nor South Korea offered automatic citizenship to their repatriates. This may have contributed to the much smaller numbers of Poles and Koreans who returned to their respective homelands compared to the millions of German returnees after their country's offer of official repatriation in the form of citizenship, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The most significant notable difference in their repatriation policies among these three countries is German's rationale behind their policy to protect their exiled countrymen from persecution. Though countries everywhere routinely express concern for the well-being of their citizens and compatriots abroad, in Germany there is a remedial measure and protection for their ethnic group that is rarely found in Poland and South Korea. Offering the overall integration package including housing and other adjustments such as medical care and some amount of resettlement funds, the former German Prime Minister, Helmut Kohl stated, the reception of the co-ethnics was "a national task for all" and if Germans turned their backs on their "compatriots", they would be "a morally deprived people" (Note 15).
Repatriates' Economic Policies in Their Homelands
The ethnic Germans who repatriated to their homeland, particularly in the 1940s, played an important role in Germany's economic recovery (Kindleberger, 1967) . From the early stages of their repatriation, most of the German migrants became self-employed in the restaurant business -an industry that has continued to prosper to this day (Mark, 2000) . Retail and wholesale businesses are also very popular, as is the handicrafts business, which requires a higher qualification of its workers. Recently some migrants, the most famous of whom is Vural Öger, have also laid the foundation in the travel business (Note 16). Altogether the proportion of the self-employed in the foreign population constitutes 7.38%. That lays under the quota of the locals (9.42%) in the early 1980s, but since 1985 a constant adjustment has been observable (Mark, 2000:48) .
In the case of Poland, Polish society has been willing to embrace their fellow Polish countrymen overseas. Various organizations and NGOs have helped Poles in Kazakhstan visit their motherland. At the state authority level, however, the policy regarding their compatriots has been passive and lukewarm, unlike Germany's. In 1996, the Polish government adopted a resolution on repatriation. Based on this resolution, from 1997 Polish repatriates from Kazakhstan will receive money not only from charities but also from the Polish government for the first six months of their stay in Poland upon their return. Various ministries were called on to assist the repatriates: for instance, the Ministry of Labor declared that in the case of ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan, it would be able to include the years of work abroad in the total credited number of work-years, which would simplify the procedure for obtaining a pension in Poland. In addition, the Ministry of Interior created a questionnaire to establish the ethnic credentials of Poles in Kazakhstan who wish to apply for entry to Poland on the basis of a repatriation visa. The questionnaire consists of dozens of pages containing very detailed questions about the Polish roots of the applicants dating back three generations. In addition, the applicant has to complete a questionnaire in the Polish language rather than in Russian, which is more familiar to the Poles in Kazakhstan. According to experts from the Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs, the use of such a detailed questionnaire is intended to exclude persons who have no rights to Polish citizenship (Note 17) and to limit the number of immigrants using the language as a pretext.
Compared with Germany and Poland, the Korean administration has not exhibited much interest in their fellow countrymen residing abroad at either the civic or federal levels. According to Skrentny, Chan, Fox, and Kim (2007) , Korea's ethnic preference policy is rather complex, though it recognizes blood bonds and gives preferences to ethnic Koreans that are unavailable to other foreigners. Recently, the Korean government has allowed the repatriation of Koreans abroad for the sake of economic purposes. Ethnic Koreans began to return in the late 1980s. After an initial period of indecision, Korea avoided giving Koryoin (Korean-Russians; Korean immigrants and their descendants in Russia) free access to the labor market. In addition, Korea separated the Koryoin from other ethnic Koreans in the West. Basically ethnic Koreans can be categorized into four main groups: Korean-American, Korea-Japanese, Koryoin, and Joseonjok (Korean-Chinese; Korean immigrants and their descendants in China). The former two groups can be found working in professional fields, such as finance (market place), education, and broadcasting, whereas the latter two groups mostly engage in construction, service industries, and the manufacturing fields. As described by Seol and Skrentny (2004) , the Korean Federation of Small Business (KFSB) began to lobby for legal access to foreign labor in the late 1980s. In 1991, Korea's Ministry of Justice created the Industrial Technical Training Program (ITTP) to meet this need. Thus, Korea targeted and imported Koryoin within the confines of the labor importation program since some policymakers feared economic and social problems that a mass influx of unskilled Koryoin would cause (Note 18).
Though the ITTP was ostensibly for teaching and transferring skills to less developed countries, it has always been a program for importing labor for unskilled jobs. It was originally and officially limited to Korean companies with investments or partnerships with firms in eleven specified countries, but has grown in size and its limitations have relaxed. Koryoin remains the second largest group of foreigners in the program and the second largest group among undocumented workers (Seol and Skrentny, 2004 ) (Note 19).
In 2002, policymakers created another program for importing labor force. In the Employment Management Program for Overseas Ethnic Koreans (Chuieop Gwanri Jedo), overseas Koreans over the age of forty and with family (cousins or closer relatives) in Korea would receive special two-year visas to work in the labor-starved service industry, especially restaurants, cleaning companies, and nursing facilities (not as nurses, but "caregivers"); construction was added later, fueled by the shortage of manpower in the 3-D jobs in Korean society due to the rapid economic growth, and rise in living standards and wages. Employers can now hire up to ten overseas Koreans provided they show they cannot find workers domestically (Joongang Ilbo, July 18, 2002; Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 2002) . Though nominally open to any overseas ethnic Korean, the program was clearly targeted to the relatively disadvantaged Koryoin and Joseonjok.
Hence, it is true that the rationale for co-ethnic preference in Korea is quite different from that in Germany, providing needed labor or skill for economic development with minimal disruption of Korean society and the Korean labor market. To be sure, there have been a few obstacles of supporting and protecting rationale to these policies practically, but it is important to note that these policies all bring economic benefits and very little cost to the Korean government (Note 20). Though the Korean Constitutional Court stated the law's purpose was "to promote globalization of the Korean society by encouraging more active participation of ethnic Koreans living abroad in all spheres of the Korean society" and "the Act aims to encourage investment in Korea by simplifying regulations" on business dealings, how the law has been and will be practiced in Korea is still in question.
All in all, as shown in the modified Table 3 from Skrentny, Chan, Fox, and Kim (2007) , there are some distinct regional patterns among the three nations. Most importantly, Korean ethnic preferences are more instrumentally integrated into the country's larger policy objectives than those practices in Western Europe, and specifically they are geared toward economic development, utilizing skills, and investment preferences. In contrast, the European policies have been mostly expressions of ties or efforts at protection. Rather than tools for economic development, European preferences are a kind of protective or expressive nationalism.
Conclusion
The ethnic communities of Korea, Germany, and Poland experienced either voluntary migration, suffered compulsory relocation, or both, and in doing so, carry distinctions as well as share common denominators. The three nations maintained the kind of diaspora that lives in Russia and has its own nation-state in foreign countries as in Table 1c . They all also belong to the diaspora as the result of the ethnic migration as in Table 2b . However, while Koreans faced both voluntary and compulsory migration in Maritime Province and in Central Asia respectively, Germans experienced only voluntary resettlement in Maritime Province, and Poles suffered tragic deportation to Central Asia. Unlike German immigrants who stayed in the Far East with business-oriented minds, Koreans, comprised of mostly peasants and soldiers, settled in the Maritime Province looking for food and escaping Japanese repressive measures. The Poles who were deported to Kazakhstan consisted of members of Polish secret organizations, soldiers, and civilian fighters against the Russian Empire.
In terms of the policies of three nations for the emigrants to Russia, feeling responsibility for their fellow countrymen and considering protection of their men as a primary priority, the German government exhibits a devotion to bring their overseas nationals back to their motherland. The Polish administration depends on civil organizations and NGOs to repatriate the Kazakh Poles, somehow trying to limit the number of Poles, who wish to return to Poland. Quite differently from Germany and Poland, the Korean government and NGOs have not shown any practical policies for Koreans in Russia except maintaining the economic rationale for repatriation. As neglecting to embrace Koreans overseas and taking advantage of them for economic purposes, the Korean government should recall what Helmut Kohl declared: "the reception of the co-ethnics was a national task for all and if Germans turned their backs on their compatriots they would be a morally deprived people."
This interregional comparison thus suggests that the justifications noted by -assimilability, protection, and expression -may be unique to or more pronounced in Germany and Poland. In addition, the comparison makes the German policies appear especially romantic or even irrational, as economic justifications are absent or muted, and policy does not clearly link the co-ethnics into the economy. Though European states have enjoyed the economic benefits associated with the return of their ethnic migrants, they have also experienced, at times, the short-term economic burdens and declines, owing to the subsidies and support funds that were spent on the migrants. Meanwhile, Korea combines its focus on economic development with a relative lack of interest in the brotherly love and the humanitarianism found in European preferences. As Skrentny, Chan, Fox, and Kim (2007) stated, the three regions appeal to blood-based kinship and the emotions that go with it, but have very different approaches and purposes. In Korea it is a means to an end, and in Europe it appears more as an end in itself. 
